A few weeks into the Warsh Fed Chairmanship, there are a couple of changes that I think are worth pointing out. Both are subtle, and I present them as a longtime Fed watcher, rates strategist, and Inflation Guy.
The first one is something I missed at first, until I heard it again. Warsh has been talking in terms of the Federal Reserve having a 2% target or goal. This may not seem like much, since central bankers routinely pledge allegiance to that goal. But over the Powell term as Chairman, that went from being something concrete to merely vacuously aspirational.
First, in 2020, the Fed abandoned a 2% target and instead implemented “Flexible Average Inflation Targeting,” or FAIT. That policy said that if inflation ran below (above) the 2% target, the central bank would adjust policy to allow it to subsequently run above (below) the target for a time in order to get the average back to 2%. Now, this presumes a fine motor control over inflation that the Fed most certainly has never demonstrated, and it also conveniently left out parameters such as the averaging period. But at least it was a strategy (ambiguous, but a strategy) rather than merely a goal.
Then, in August 2025, Chairman Powell announced that the Fed was abandoning the ‘make-up’ part of the strategy. So, the Fed would still target 2%, but only as an average over time, and if inflation deviated from that average, they wouldn’t do anything about it. I wrote about it at the time in “The Fate of FAIT was Fated.” It really helped highlight the flaccidity of the Powell chairmanship.
Yet, Powell continued to talk in terms of a 2% target. In my mind, that’s just going back to an aspirational, hypothetical goal. We aren’t trying to get inflation to 2% now, mind you, just over time. Over some unspecified amount of time. And if we try to lower inflation and can’t get it down, we just re-select the averaging period, I guess. If we were at 5% for a while, so you lost a lot of real wealth, and then inflation returns to 2%…well, then a year or so later the Fed says ‘see? The average over the last year was 2%. Sorry about all that other money you were counting on. That’s never coming back.’
Anyway, so Warsh has been referring to a 2% target. It’s not clear to me in what context he means that. In the original sense of ‘we respond when it deviates from that level’? In the current sense of ‘it would be nice, but we aren’t going to take any specific actions over any specific period’? Or does he mean to reinstitute a commitment strategy so that 2% means something? I sure hope it’s the latter, and I have certainly seen some signs that Warsh is a bit sharper than the last few Fed Chairmen, but until he says so I suppose we don’t know for sure. He could do worse than to systematically dismantle everything that Powell did…
The other change is large and obvious, but there is a subtle effect that I think is being missed and should be pointed out. Under Chairman Warsh, the Fed has moved to eliminate forward guidance. The number of speeches from Fed officials is probably likely to decline as a result, since that’s the only reason anyone goes to listen to a Fed speaker.[1]
I have said a huge number of times that I think more opacity from the Fed is super important in helping to squeeze excess financial risk from the system. Other folks have made the same observation, and clearly Warsh agrees with this – he frames it in terms of giving the Fed more flexibility to change course when data changes, but the only reason that opacity does that is because in the alternative case there is a disincentive to change very much lest people think the central bank – gasp! – is unable to forecast the economy very well and is being surprised a lot.
But here is what I think people have missed. It is my belief that this change is also part of the Fed’s inflation-fighting strategy. Here is the mapping of my reasoning. Less guidance obviously produces more policy uncertainty, and I just pointed out that means it is prudent to carry less financial leverage.
Another way to say the same thing, but focusing on individuals rather than institutions, is that increasing policy uncertainty leads to more demand for precautionary cash balances. Institutions respond to greater uncertainty and volatility by reducing risk. Individuals respond to greater uncertainty by holding more cash, so that they can respond to the increased vicissitudes of life – job loss, for example.
And that’s important, because an increase in the demand for precautionary cash balances implies lower monetary velocity, and lower velocity means a lower price level for the same level of money and output. This is a big part of why inflation did not immediately explode when the Fed and Treasury dumped trillions of dollars of liquidity into the economy almost overnight – people were scared and held a lot of that cash for a while, rather than spending the money. As we know, velocity eventually rebounded as people spent those balances down, and inflation resulted.
As a matter of fact, Economic Policy Uncertainty is an input variable into Enduring Investments’ model for money velocity. It is not nearly as important a variable as the absolute level of interest rates, but we can reject the hypothesis of irrelevance at the 1% level and it improves the fit of the overall model so it is economically relevant as well.
Again, I don’t really know if this is part of Warsh’s master plan, or just a fortunate outcome. But luck is the residue of design. For now, I’m hopeful this is more design than luck – but I will take it, either way.
[1] It isn’t like they are at all entertaining, even to an economist. Why would you subject yourself to a Fed speech, if there is no useful forward-looking content?!
